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Kilty: Bankruptcy Law

BANKRUPTCY LAW

BFP u. IMPERIAL SA VINGS AND
LOAN ASSOCIATION: RESOLVING
THE "REASONABLY EQUIVALENT
VALUE" STANDARD IN AVOIDING
FORECLOSURE SALES
I.

INTRODUCTION

In BFP v. Imperial Savings & Loan Association/ the Ninth
Circuit ruled that when a foreclosure sale is held in compliance
with applicable state procedural law2 and is non-fraudulent,3
then the sale is not voidable under the Federal Bankruptcy
Code. 4 In an effort to resolve the conflict between state and federal law, the Ninth Circuit determined that the focus of judicial
review of foreclosure sales should be shifted from price ll to pro1. BFP v. Imperial Savings and Loan Ass'n, 974 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1992) (per
Sneed, J., joined by Nelson, J., and Roll, D.J., sitting by designation), cert. granted, 114
S. Ct. 37 (1993). While this case was pending, the Resolution Trust Corporation was
appointed receiver of Imperial Savings and Loan Association. The court continued, for
convenience's sake, to refer to the appellee as Imperial, and this note will do the same.
2. A foreclosure sale held in compliance with applicable law is referred to by the
courts as a "regularly conducted" foreclosure sale. In California, section 2924 of the California Civil Code governs foreclosure sale procedures. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924 (West
1993).
3. A nonfraudulent foreclosure sale is referred to by the courts as a "noncollusive"
foreclosure sale. Essentially, the term "noncollusive" describes a good faith foreclosure
sale. A "collusive" foreclosure sale is one in which the purchaser and debtor act in concert to defraud the debtor's creditors. These types of transactions are the focus of states'
fraudulent conveyance laws. Such transactions are also clearly voidable under 11 U.S.C.
§ 548(a)(l) (1988).
4. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1148.
5. The Federal Bankruptcy Code seeks to protect the debtor in foreclosure, and his
general creditors, by ensuring that the price received at foreclosure is reasonable. Section
548(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code allows for avoidance of sales which fail to generate
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cedural compliance. 6
As a result of the Ninth Circuit decision, a non fraudulent
foreclosure sale is no longer voidable simply because it deprives
a debtor or his creditors of substantial value. 7 In essence, the
Ninth Circuit ruled that where a nonfraudulent foreclosure sale
is in procedural compliance with state foreclosure law, the federal standard of reasonably equivalent value 8 is also met. B
The Ninth Circuit's decision has created a split among federal circuit courts as to the appropriate standard for evaluating
the fairness of foreclosure sales in bankruptcy cases. The Fifth
a "reasonably equivalent value." 11 u.s.c. § 548(a)(2)(A) (1988) states in pertinent part:
(a) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of
the debtor in property, ... that was made or incurred on or
within one year before the date of the filing of the petition, if
the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily. . . (2)(A) received less
than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer or obligation . . ..
6. The Ninth Circuit choose to evaluate the fairness of the foreclosure sale based
strictly on compliance with applicable state procedures. See BFP, 974 F.2d at 1149 n.7
("We also agree with the lower courts that the applicable state procedures were complied with in this case and that BFP received adequate notice of the foreclosure under
California law. ") (emphasis added).
7. A trustee may seek to avoid a foreclosure sale under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A)
because the amount received at the sale is believed to be less than a reasonably
equivalent value. For example, an owner of a property with a fair market value of
$1,000,000 defaults on a loan against his property. The loan balance at the time of default is $500,000. The lender sells the property, complying with the appropriate procedural statutes, and receives $500,000 from a third party buyer. The sale price satisfies
the outstanding debt on the property. The amount, however, is only one half the fair
market value. The original owner, or the original owner's unsecured creditors, might argue that the equity in the property prior to the forced sale (the difference between the
fair market value and the forced sale price) was unjustly depleted in the sale. Prior to
the BFP holding, they could challenge the foreclosure sale as constructively fraudulent
and avoidable under 11 U.S.C. §548(a)(2)(A) because reasonably equivalent value was
not received.
8. "Reasonably equivalent value" is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code. "Value" is
defined in 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2) (1988) as "property, or satisfaction or securing of a
present or antecedent debt of the debtor, but does not include an unperformed promise
to furnish support to the debtor or to a relative of the debtor .... " Therefore, arguably,
the price received at a mortgage foreclosure, because it is a forced sale, is a good indication of "reasonably equivalent value" under the circumstances. This rationale seems fair
in cases such as BFP, where the foreclosure price was sufficient to payoff the antecedent
debt. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1145. On the other hand, when a debtor's interest is sold at a
foreclosure sale for a mere fraction of its fair market value, a convincing argument can be
made that the sale was not for "reasonably equivalent value." For further discussion of
reasonably equivalent value, see infra notes 50 to 120 and accompanying text.
9. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1149.
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and Seventh Circuits, for example, have held that a nonfraudulent, properly conducted foreclosure sale is not necessarily adequate protection for debtors under the Federal Code. lo These
courts have held that a separate inquiry is necessary to determine whether the federal requirement of "reasonably equivalent
value" is established. l l In contrast, the Ninth Circuit's BFP decision declares that a separate inquiry is not necessary where
procedural compliance with state foreclosure law exists. 12
By effectively preempting the federal statute in state foreclosure actions, the Ninth Circuit holding draws a clear line between sales that satisfy the reasonably equivalent value standard
and those that do not. But by overlooking judicial middle
ground between the two standards, the Ninth Circuit's holding
has the effect of making the federal statute illusory. This note
analyzes the reasoning behind the appellate court decision and
the court's reliance on what it called "broader considerations."l3
This note compares the Ninth Circuit holding with a previously
suggested alternative model which advocates the review of a
foreclosure sales price only when state foreclosure procedures
are insufficiently structured to produce a maximum forced sale
price. 14 The conclusion is that both state and federal interests
can be accommodated without resort to an exclusion of one in
favor of the other.
10. See Bundles v. Baker, 865 F.2d 815, 824 (7th Cir. 1988) (explaining that "[i)n
defining reasonably equivalent value, the court should neither grant a conclusive presumption in favor of a purchaser at a regularly conducted, noncollusive foreclosure sale,
nor limit its inquiry to a simple comparison of the sale price to the fair market value
. . . . Reasonable equivalence should depend on all the facts of each case."); see also
Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 204 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that the
price paid at the trustee's sale was not a fair equivalent even though the foreclosure sale
complied procedurally with state law).
11. See, e.g., Bundles, 865 F.2d at 824; Durrett, 621 F.2d at 204.
12. See BFP, 974 F.2d at 1148.
13. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1148. The court explained that the stability of the state foreclosure market and "due regard for traditional state areas of regulation" were considerations which outweighed the concern for a plain language interpretation of §548. Id.
Moreover, judicial scrutiny and avoidance of properly conducted, non fraudulent sales,
could create foreclosure market instability. The court's fear is that foreclosure sale bidders would discount their bids to account for the uncertainty of the sale. Thus, the application of 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A), intended to protect the debtor's assets, could in fact
have a negative impact upon the value of the debtor's assets by discouraging aggressive
foreclosure sale bidding. See id.
14. See infra notes 153-63 and accompanying text.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1994

3

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 4

550

II.

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:547

F ACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In July of 1987, several parties came together with the intention of purchasing, remodeling, and reselling the Newport
Beach home of Sheldon and Ann Foreman. 1I1 The parties involved were Wayne Pedersen, his wife Marlene, and Russell Barton. A written agreement was made between the Pedersens and
Barton in which the Pedersens agreed to buy the Foreman home
for $356,250 plus some rare coins. I6 In turn, the Pedersens
agreed to give Barton a 180-day option to purchase the home. In
exchange for this option, Barton agreed to pay the Pedersens
twenty-five percent of the profits realized from a later sale of the
home. I7
After the sale to the Pedersens entered escrow, the nature
of the agreement changed. Because of local newspaper reports
about an investigation of fraudulent rare coin sales by Mr.
Pedersen, an oral agreement was made between all of the parties
to restructure the deal. This restructuring included the formation of a partnership which would purchase the home. I8 The
BFP partnership was formed with Wayne and Marlene Pedersen
and Russell Barton as the sole partners. As in the prior arrangement, profits realized on the resale of the home were to be divided seventy-five percent to Barton and twenty-five percent to
the Pedersens. I9
On August 27, 1987, the Foremans deeded the property to
the Pedersens who, on the same day, deeded the property to the
BFP partnership.20 The $356,250 used to make the purchase was
borrowed from Imperial Federal Savings and Loan Association
("Imperial") and was secured by a first deed of trust on the
15. BFP v. Imperial Sav. and Loan Ass'n (In re BFP), 132 B.R. 748, 749 (Bankr. 9th
Cir. 1991).
16. BFP v. Imperial Sav. and Loan Ass'n (In re BFP), 974 F.2d 1144, 1145 (9th Cir.
1992). The value of the coins was not disclosed in the pleadings.
17. Id. Barton intended to remodel the home for resale.
18. Id. It is not clear why the partnership was formed. See infra note 20.
19. Id.
20. Id. It is' possible the formation of the BFP partnership was an attempt to create
a "Bona Fide Purchaser" entity. The transfer of the property to the BFP partnership
might have been intended to insulate the property, and BFP, from a possible voided
transaction later. See infra note 34 for a discussion of "bona fide purchaser."
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property.21 In lieu of tendering the rare coins, the BFP partnership issued a six month promissory note to the Foremans in the
amount of $200,OOO~22 This promissory note was secured by a
second deed of trust on the property.23
Concerns created by the investigation of Mr. Pedersen
proved well founded: Following the purchase of the home from
the Foremans, Mr. Pedersen conveyed the property not only to
the BFP partnership, but also to a concern called Off Road Vehicles-Recreation and Family Campground, Inc. 24 BFP and the
Foremans immediately sued to quiet title 21i to the property.28
While this state court action was pending, Imperial "entered a
notice of default under the first deed of trust"27 and instituted
foreclosure proceedings on the property.28 In an attempt to secure an automatic stay of this foreclosure proceeding, Off Road
then filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition on behalf of
BFP.29 BFP responded by moving to dismiss the involuntary petition. 30 Imperial then moved to lift the automatic stay.31 The
bankruptcy court granted both of these motions, lifting the stay
on June 12, 1989, and dismissing the involuntary case on June
14, 1989. 32
On July 12, 1989, Imperial conducted a foreclosure sale and
21. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1145.
22. [d. It can be inferred that the Foremans, after becoming aware·of the investiga·
tion of Mr. Pedersen's rare coin dealings, decided not to accept rare coins in the
transaction.
23. [d.
24. [d.
25. A quiet title action is "[a] proceeding to establish the plaintiff's title to land by
bringing into court an adverse claimant and there compelling him either to establish his
claim or be forever after estopped from asserting it." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1249 (6th
ed. 1990).
26. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1145.
27. BFP, 132 B.R. 748, 749 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991). Payments were not being made
on the first deed of trust loan. [d.
28. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1145.
29. [d. An involuntary bankruptcy petition allows creditors of an insolvent debtor to
effectively force the debtor into bankruptcy. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 148 (6th ed. 1990);
see also 11 U.S.C. § 303 (1988).
30. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1145; BFP, 132 B.R. at 749.
31. [d. Under California law, the foreclosure proceeding instituted by Imperial was
automatically stayed by Off Road's involuntary bankruptcy petition. See 11 U.S.C. § 303
(1988).
32. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1145.
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sold the property to Paul Osborne for $433,000. 33 Mr. Osborne
had no notice of the title dispute and bought the property in
good faith. 34 BFP alleges that as a result of the sale it lost its
equity in the property.311
On July 21, 1989, the state court in the quiet title action
announced its intention to settle the dispute by rescinding the
original 1987 conveyance by the Foremans to the Pedersens.s8
Damages were to be awarded to both the Foremans and Barton
against the Pedersens. 37 Final judgment on this quiet title action
was entered on October 12, 1989. 38
After the quiet title decision was announced, BFP, joined by
the Foremans, filed a second state court action attempting to
have the foreclosure sale conveyance to Osborne rescinded. 3D
The suit alleged Imperial did not comply with California foreclosure procedures. 4o This second state suit was stayed however,
when on October 25, 1989, BFP filed for voluntary Chapter 11
bankruptcy protection. 41
BFP then instituted the action which formed the basis of
the Ninth Circuit decision. In bankruptcy court, BFP attempted
to have the transfer to Osborne voided. 42 On March 6, 1990, the
33. [d. Imperial was able to proceed with the foreclosure sale because the automatic
stay had been lifted. See 11 U.S.C. § 303 (1988).
34. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1145. The fact that Mr. Osborne purchased the property without notice of the clouded title and in good faith is significant because this gives him
"bona fide purchaser" status. A "bona fide purchaser" is defined as "[olne who has purchased property for value without any notice of any defects in the title of the seller."
BUCK'S LAW DICTIONARY 177 (6th ed. 1990). Pursuant to California law, title to the
property became vested in Mr. Osborne upon delivery and execution of the trustee's
deed. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1091, 1053, 1054 (Deering 1990).
35. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1145. BFP alleges the value of the property was $725,000.
Since the sale was for $433,000. the equity allegedly lost amounted to $292,000. This
amount includes the Foremans' $200,000 interest in the property via the second deed of
trust.
36. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1145.
37. [d. at 1146.
38. [d.
39. [d. The Foremans joined BFP in this action because, although the state court
had ruled the original conveyance to the Pedersens to be void, the Foremans still stood
to lose their interest in the property (the second deed) because of Osborne's good faith
purchase at the foreclosure sale. [d.
40. [d. (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924 (West 1993)).
41. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1146; see 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988).
42. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1146.
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bankruptcy court dismissed the complaint.'3 The eourt also
ruled that Osborne was a "bona fide purchaser for value, without
notice,"" and found "no legal authority to set aside the
sale. . . . "'11 The bankruptcy court decision was "summarily affirmed" by the district court.'6
BFP appealed on May 9, 1990." On July 10, 1990 the bankruptcy court again ruled in favor of Imperial, granting summary
judgment.'8 On November 5, 1991, the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed the bankruptcy court ruling.'9
43. Id. ("BFP did not make any allegation that Imperial's trustee sale was in violation of California law ... [or that] the sale was conducted fraudulently or collusively.").
Under In re Madrid, the party seeking to set aside the transfer must show that the sale
failed to comply with applicable California law or that the sale was conducted collusively. See In re Madrid, 21 B.R. 424, 427 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982) (construing the "reasonably equivalent value requirement of Code § 548(a)(2) to mean the same as the consideration received at a non-collusive and regularly conducted foreclosure sale"), aff'd on
other grounds, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984); see infra
notes 57-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of Madrid.
44. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1146; see supra note 34.
45. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1146.
46.Id.
47. Id. The record incorrectly notes the date as May 9, 1991.
48. The court held that BFP did not in fact have a property interest because "the
Petersons [sic] did not have an interest in property when they purported to transfer the
title to ... BFP. Therefor [sic], BFP never received good title." BFP, 974 F.2d at 1146.
Without a property interest, the court reasoned, BFP could not seek avoidance under 11
U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A). The court also held that there could be no avoidance under 11
U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) because "a reasonably equivalent value was received in exchange
for the transfer, [and] the nonjudicial foreclosure sale was non-collusive and regularly
conducted." BFP, 974 F.2d at 1146.
49. BFP, 132 B.R. 748, 751 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991) The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
"hesitated to use the state court rescission to determine the interests of these parties or
to dispose of this appeal." Id. at 749 n.4. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel noted that
while the bankruptcy court found that BFP had no interest in the property (because of
the rescission), the "same could be said of Imperial's interest in the property." Id. Instead, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed that a noncollusive, regularly conducted
non-judicial foreclosure sale could not "be challenged as a fraudulent conveyance ...
[because] such a sale establishes 'reasonably equivalent value' as a matter of law." Id. at
750 (citing In re Madrid, 21 B.R. 424 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982)). In addition, the court
found BFP had received proper notice of the foreclosure sale since "publication for three
consecutive weeks is sufficient notice, even. where the sale was postponed due to bankruptcy, and not renoticed after bankruptcy... " Id. (citing Lupertino v. Carbahal, 111
Cal.Rptr. 112, 115 (Ct. App. 1973)). The court also found BFP's claim, that it was verbally misled by Imperial's attorney into believing the foreclosure sale would not be held
until after the conclusion of the state court proceeding, did "not state a claim for estoppel." Id.
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III. BACKGROUND
The Ninth Circuit, and other circuit courts, have developed
differing approaches to the reasonably equivalent value issue addressed in BFP. Holdings within the Ninth Circuit have been
inconsistent. Some courts have followed the 1982 In re Madridr.o
decision while other courts have parted with its reasoning. Madrid held that a noncollusive, regularly conducted foreclosure
sale established reasonable equivalence as a matter of law.r.l
In Durrett v. Washington National Insurance CO.,r.2 a 1980
decision by the Fifth Circuit, the court held that 57.7% of fair
market value was not, in that case, a fair equivalent.r.3 Avoidance
of the trustee sale was justified in Durrett despite compliance
with applicable state procedural laws.r.4 Since the early eighties,
many courts have referred to the reasonably equivalent value issue as the Madrid/Durrett debate.r.r. The following provides a
brief background of the reasonable equivalence issue, as it has
developed within the Ninth Circuit, and in the other circuits.
A.. THE NINTH CIRCUIT HISTORY - A DIVIDED CIRCUITr.s
In 1982, the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel decided In re Madrid.r.7 Madrid held that properly conducted,
noncollusive foreclosure sales establish reasonably equivalent
value as a matter of law.r.s In reaching its conclusion, the Appellate Panel first examined the Fifth Circuit's holding in Durrettr.9
which voided a transfer for lack of reasonably equivalent value
50. In re Madrid, 21 B.R. 424 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982), aff'd on other grounds, 725
F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984).
51. Id. at 427.
52. Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980).
53. Id. at 203.
54. The sale in Durrett was made by the trustee pursuant to the power of sale provision of the deed of trust. Id. at 204.
55. See, e.g., Bundles, 856 F.2d at 821.
56. See In re Haider, 126 B.R. 796, 799 (Bankr. D.Mont. 1991) (describing the law
in the Ninth Circuit regarding the application of Bankruptcy Code § 548(a)(2)(A) to
non-judicial foreclosure sales as being in disarray as a result of conflicting decisions from
the Central and Southern Districts of California).
57. Madrid, 21 B.R. 424.
58. Id. at 427.
59. 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980).
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under circumstances involving a voluntary, private transfer. 60
Madrid, which involved an involuntary, public sale, declined to
follow Durrett because it believed "a regularly conducted sale,
open to all bidders and all creditors, is itself a safeguard against
the evils of private transfers ... "61 The Madrid court went on to
conclude that "the law of foreclosure should be harmonized with
the law of fraudulent conveyances. Compatible results can be
obtained by construing the reasonably equivalent value requirement of Code § 548(a)(2) to mean the same as the consideration
received at a non-collusive and regularly conducted foreclosure
sale. "62 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel in Madrid on other grounds. 63
Some Ninth Circuit bankruptcy courts have followed the
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel decision in Madrid while others
have parted with its holding. The court in In re Verna,6' for example, followed Madrid, holding that "where a third party
purchases property at a non-collusive and regularly conducted
foreclosure sale, the sale establishes the reasonably equivalent
value required by Bankruptcy Code section 548."65 The Verna
court followed the appellate panel in Madrid although it determined that stare decisis did not apply.66
60. Madrid, 21 B.R. at 425-26. See infra notes 84-89 and corresponding text for
discussion of the Durrett holding.
61. Madrid, 21 B.R. at 426-27.
62. Id. at 427 (relying on Golden v. Tomiyasu, 387 P.2d 989 (Nev. 1963), and Oller
v. Sonoma County Land Title Co., 290 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1955), for the proposition that
more than mere inadequacy of price is required to upset a foreclosure sale).
63. In re Madrid, 725 F.2d at 1199. The Ninth Circuit found that the "foreclosure
sale was not a transfer under § 548(a)" and therefore did "not decide whether the
amount paid at foreclosure was a reasonably equivalent value." Id.
64. In re Verna, 58 B.R. 246 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986).
65. Id. at 251. This holding is in line with the Madrid decision. However Verna
limits its decision to 'third party' purchasers. Madrid did not distinguish between a third
party purchaser and a trustee purchaser. Madrid, 21 B.R. !It 427.
66. Verna, 58 B.R. at 251-52 (finding the Madrid Bankruptcy Appellate Panel's reasoning persuasive even though it believed the appellate panel's decision was not controlling). The 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act ("BAFJA") revised
the definition of "transfer" to include the foreclosure of the debtor's equity of redemption. See infra note 110. This revision effectively overruled the Ninth Circuit decision in
Madrid which had affirmed the appellate panel decision because it found the foreclosure
sale was not a transfer. Madrid, 725 F.2d at 1199. According to the Verna court, the
bankruptcy appellate panel decision did not survive the BAFJA amendments. Verna, 58
B.R. at 251-52. See also Alan S. Gover & Glenn D. West, The Texas Nonjudicial Foreclosure Process - A Proposal to Reconcile the Procedures Mandated by State Law
with the Fraudulent Conveyance Principles of The Bankruptcy Code, 43 Sw. L.J. 1061,
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The court in In re Kachanizadeh 67 also followed Madrid.
Kachanizadeh believed it was bound by stare decisis, stating
"this court is required to follow the [Madrid] bankruptcyappellate panel's holding on this issue."68 Kachanizadeh believed it
was bound because of the bankruptcy appellate panel decision in
In re Ehring.69 The Ehring court, although deciding a § 547
case, "agree[d] with those courts which have found that Madrid
is still valid law."70
While Verna, Kachanizadeh, and Ehring followed Madrid,
other Ninth Circuit bankruptcy courts did not. In Oregon, the
court in In re Staples 71 determined it was not bound by stare
decisis 72 and after an "independent determination of the law"7s
concluded that the reasoning of the dissent in Madrid was persuasive. 74 The court held that "the price paid at a regularly conducted foreclosure sale should be accorded, at best, a strong presumption of adequacy."76 The Staples court emphasized the
equity concerns involved: "It is not inequitable to require that a
purchaser who receives a windfall at a foreclosure sale return
that value to the estate. . .. Buyers wishing to bargain-hunt do
so at their own risk."76 The court pointed out that if a sale is
1079 n.139 (1990) (stating that the 1984 bankruptcy amendments did not overrule the
Madrid appellate panel decision).
67. 108 B.R. 734 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1989).
68. Kachanizadeh, 108 B.R. at 738. In contrast to the court in Verna, the
Kachanizadeh court believed the Madrid Bankruptcy Appellate Panel decision did survive the BAFJA amendments. It is worth noting that the court, although it followed the
Madrid appellate panel, stated that it "believe[d) Lindsay is the better approach." Id.
See infra notes 78-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of Lindsay.
69. 91 B.R. 897 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1988).
70. Ehring, 91 B.R. at 901. In dicta, the court also stated: "This argument [that the
creditor received a windfall when it purchased the property at the foreclosure sale and
resold it at fair market value) ... should properly be challenged under Section 548 as a
fraudulent transfer. Even assuming this argument was properly raised before this Panel,
we find no windfall where the property is sold at the lien value in a non-collusive regularly held foreclosure sale." Id. This dicta in effect restates the holding in Madrid. See
Madrid, 21 B.R. at 427.
71. 87 B.R. 645 (Bankr. D. Ore. 1988).
72. Staples, 87 B.R. at 646 (stating that the bankruptcy appellate panel's decision
in Madrid was not revived when Congress overruled the Ninth Circuit's Madrid
decision).
73.Id.
74. Id. See In re Madrid, 21 B.R. at 428 (Volinn, J., dissenting); see also notes 19094 and accompanying text for discussion of Madrid dissent.
75. Staples, 87 B.R. at 646. See contra Leisman v. Tracy, Adv. No. 86-0360 (Bankr.
D. Or. 1986) (relying on Madrid).
76. Staples, 87 B.R. at 646.
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avoided, the good faith purchaser will be protected under § 548
(C).77

The court in Lindsay v. Beneficial Reinsurance Co. (In re
Lindsay)78 also parted with Madrid, suggesting a three-part inquiry.79 The first inquiry according to the Lindsay court, should
be whether the foreclosure sale "was properly conducted in accordance with state law and was non-collusive."80 The second inquiry should go beyond mere compliance with state law and ask
"whether commercially reasonable steps were taken to achieve
the best price at the foreclosure."81 And finally, only if the sale is
deemed to be commercially unreasonable, should the court
make the third inquiry and analyze evidence of the value of the
property to determine if less than rellsonably equivalent value
was received. 82 By applying this three-part test, the court stated
it was "not elevating compliance with state court foreclosure
standards above all other factors ... [and n]either [was] the
Court looking solely to percentage of fair market value
achieved. "83
These cases demonstrate how Ninth Circuit courts have
struggled with the reasonably equivalent value issue where the
value received at foreclosure is very low yet state foreclosure
77. Id. Section 548(c) (1978) reads in pertinent part:
Except to the extent that a transfer or obligation voida·
ble under this section is voidable under section 544,
545, or 547 of this title, a transferee or obligee of such a
transfer or obligation that takes for value and in good
faith has a lien on or may retain any interest transferred or may enforce any obligation incurred, as the
case may be, to the extent that such transferee or obligee gave value to the debtor in exchange for such transfer or obligation.
78. Lindsay v. Beneficial Reinsurance Co. (In re Lindsay), 98 B.R. 983 (Bankr.
D.Cal. 1989).
79. Id. at 991; see also In re Haider, 126 B.R. 796 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1991) (applying
the Lindsay three part test in measuring reasonable equivalence).
80. This portion of the Lindsay test is equivalent to the Madrid test; see Madrid, 21
B.R. at 427.
81. Lindsay, 98 B.R. at 991. This second inquiry, requiring commercial reasonableness at the foreclosure sale, goes beyond Madrid. The Lindsay court states that if commercially reasonable steps are taken by the foreclosing creditor, to achieve the best possible price at the foreclosure sale, the sale will remain undisturbed even if the price
received is a very low percentage of the property's fair market value.
82.Id.
83.Id.
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procedures have been followed. Madrid established a bright line
standard by holding that compliance with state foreclosure procedures assured reasonably equivalent value. Some Ninth Circuit courts have followed Madrid, but others have been uncomfortable with the Madrid result. The Ninth Circuit decision in
BFP resolves the issue by essentially reaffirming the holding in
Madrid.

B.

THE OTHER CIRCUIT COURTS - FROM DURRETT TO BUNDLES

There has also been a lack of consensus regarding the
proper application of the reasonably equivalent value standard
among the other circuits. The Fifth Circuit opened the debate in
1980. In Durrett v. Washington National Insurance CO.,84 the
court found that where a parcel of real estate sold at a foreclosure sale for "approximately 57.7 percent of [its] ... fair market value,"81i a "fair equivalent" was not received. 88 In voiding
the transfer, the Fifth Circuit used the fraudulent conveyance
avoiding powers of the Bankruptcy Code for one of the first
times. 87 The Durrett court found that after "review of the entire
evidence," the foreclosure sale should not stand due to lack of
fair equivalence. 88 In its holding, the court remarked it was unable to find district or appellate court precedent approving a
transfer of real property for less than seventy percent of market
value. Because of this commentary by the court, Durrett has
84. Durrett, 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980).
85. Id. at 203.
86. Durrett was decided under § 67(d) of the Bankruptcy Act which allowed avoid-

ance of transfers in which a "fair equivalent" was not received. Section 548(a)(2)(A),
enacted in 1978 to replace § 67(d), substitutes the wording "reasonably equivalent
value" in place of "fair equivalent." The meaning of the two phrases is substantially the
same. See Ehrlich, supra note 116 at 945 (discussing the change in terminology from
"fair equivalent" to "reasonably equivalent value").
87. Gover & West, supra note 66, at 1073 (noting that despite the existence of
fraudulent conveyance provisions in the bankruptcy laws since the early 1800's, the provisions do not appear to have been applied to set aside a foreclosure sale prior to the
Fifth Circuit's holding in Durrett); but see Schafer v. Hammond, 456 F.2d 15 (lOth Cir.
1972» (where a sale was voided because the value received was determined to be 50% of
market value). The Durrett court's decision was widely criticized. See, e.g., Lawrence D.
Coppel & Lewis A. Kahn, Defanging Durrett: The Established Law of Transfer, 100
BANKING L.J, 676 (1983); Robert M. Zinman, James A. Houle, & Alan J. Weiss, Fraudulent Transfers According to Alden, Gross & Borowitz: A Tale of Two Circuits, 39 Bus.
LAW, 977 (1984); see also Gover & West, supra note 66, at 1061 n.9 (listing numerous
articles that have been written on the Durrett holding).
88. Durrett, 621 F.2d at 203.
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come to stand for the proposition that a transfer is voidable
under the fraudulent conveyance statutes when the value received is less than seventy percent of market value. While not an
accurate interpretation of Durrett, it has become the popular
reading. 89

In re Hulm 90 was the next significant Circuit court decision
on the 'reasonably equivalent value' issue. This Eighth Circuit
decision came after the Ninth Circuit holding in Madrid and declined to adopt the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy
Appellate PanePl Although the North Dakota Bankruptcy
Court relied on Madrid and found reasonably equivalent value
as a matter of law, the Eighth Circuit remanded stating, "we do
not believe that the sale price at a regularly conducted foreclosure sale, although absent fraud or collusion, can automatically
be deemed to provide a reasonably equivalent value in exchange
for the interest of the debtor transferred within the meaning of
section 548 (a)."92 The court believed an evidentiary hearing was
needed to provide an answer. 93
In re Winshall Settlors' Trust 94 was decided in 1985. The
Sixth Circuit followed the Ninth Circuit Madrid decision stating
"the better view is that reasonable equivalence for the purposes
of a foreclosure sale under § 548(a)(2)(A) should be consonant
with the state law of fraudulent conveyances."91i The Winshall
court points to Madrid and what the Winshall court calls the
"well nigh universal rule that mere inadequacy of price alone
does not justify setting aside an execution sale . . . there must
be in addition proof of some element of fraud, unfairness or oppression. . .. "96 The Winshall court found the Durrett holding
objectionable because it believed that "following the Durrett
89. The Durrett holding was based on "a review of the entire evidence," not on the
fact that 57% of estimated market value fell short of 70%. Id. at 204.
90. Hulm v. Brigham (In re Hulm), 738 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1984).
91. Id. at 327.
92.Id.
93. Id. The court acknowledged the effect its holding would have on purchasers at
judicial foreclosure sales, but believed the clear provisions of the bankruptcy code "direct[edl the result. reached." Id.
94. In re Winshall Settlors' Trust, 758 F.2d 1136 (6th Cir. 1985).
95. Id. at 1139. This statement also appears to be dicta as it is preceded by the
conditional phrase: "Even if the sale in question were a transfer subject to § 548. . . . "
Id.
96.Id.
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holding would radically alter these rules."97
The Winshall court also recognized the argument of the
court in In re Richardson. 98 The Richardson court argued that
allowing state law to sanction:
exchanges in foreclosures which are not reasonably equivalent gives effect to state contract and
foreclosure policy but may overlook the interests
of other creditors of the debtor. The determination of reasonable equivalence should not be controlled by state law ... [it] should be determined
in light of the function of Section 548 in fostering
an equitable distribution of the debtor's
property.BB

Wins hall contests this argument, agreeing that "the power of .
the trustee to avoid certain preferential transfers was clearly intended to assure the equitable distribution of a debtor's assets
among unsecured creditors" but arguing that Congress could not
have intended "the rights of such creditors necessarily to override those of good faith purchasers at state foreclosure sales or
the policy judgments of states in balancing the interests of parties thereto. "100

In 1988, the Seventh Circuit decided Bundles v. Baker. 101
After summarizing the holdings in Durrett and Madrid,I°2 the
Bundles court concluded, in a lengthy analysis, that
§ 548(a)(2)(A) "establishes a federal basis - independent of state
law - for setting aside a foreclosure sale."IOs The court found
that the "unambiguous language" of § 548 "requires the review97. [d. The inference is that Durrett is seen as voiding a sale based solely on the
sale price received. A careful reading of Durrett, however, does not reveal a price only
analysis. The court's decision was based on "review of the entire evidence." Durrett, 621
F.2d at 203.
98. In re Richardson, 23 B.R. 434 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982).
99. In re Winshall Settlors' Trust, 758 F.2d at 1139 n.4 (quoting In re Richardson,
23 B.R. at 447).
100. Id. C{. Kapela v. Hewman, 649 F.2d 887, 890-91 (1st Cir. 1981) (stating that
where Bankruptcy Act rules conflict with Article 9 of the U.C.C. relating to secured
transactions, the conflicting statutes should be interpreted in a way that minimizes the
conflict and harmonizes the policies that underlie them).
101. 856 F.2d 815 (7th Cir. 1988).
102. The court considered Durrett and Madrid the "seminal cases" on the issue. Id.
at 819.
103. Id. at 823.
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ing court to make an independent assessment of whether reasonable equivalence was given."lo4
This conclusion is based on a statutory construction analysis. The court cites the Supreme Court in Central Trust Co. v.
Official Creditors' Committee of Geiger Enterprises,loll which
counsels that "the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and
if that is plain, and if the law is within the constitutional authority of the law making body which passed it, the sole function of
the courts is to enforce it according to its terms."106
In analyzing the language of the statute, the Bundles court
notes that § 548(a)(2)(A) "makes no distinction between sales
that do and sales that do not comply with state law."107 To confirm that Congress did not intend that § 548 equate reasonable
equivalence with compliance with state law, the court examined
the relevant legislative history. lOB Specifically, the court reviewed
the history surrounding the passage of the 1984 Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act ("BAFJA").109 BAFJA
was significant because it revised the definition of "transfer" for
Bankruptcy Code purposes. no A dialogue between Senators Dole
and DeConcini included several comments expressly confirming
that the BAFJA Amendments were not meant to affect the
rights of debtors under the "reasonably equivalent value" standard in § 548(a)(2)(A).1ll In addition, the BAFJA legislative his104. [d. at 821.
105. Central Trust Co. v. Official Creditors' Comm. of Geiger Enters. 454 U.S. 354
(1982) (per curiam) (quoting Caminetti v. U.S., 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917)).
106. [d. at 359-60.
107. Bundles, 856 F.2d at 821.
108. [d.
109. [d. The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L.

No. 98-353 (1984).
110. BAF JA proposed three changes to the Bankruptcy Code, two of which were
enacted into law. The two provisions enacted included one revising the definition of
"transfer" in § 101 of the Bankruptcy Code to include the "foreclosure of the debtor's
equity of redemption." 11 U.S.C. § 101(50) (1988). The other change amended § 548 to
"emphasize its applicability to transfers where the debtor 'voluntarily or involuntarily'
received less than reasonably equivalent value." Bundles, 856 F.2d at 817 n.4.
111. The following are excerpts from a scripted colloquy inserted into the Congressional Record by Senators Dole and DeConcini:
DeConcini: "My understanding is that these provisions were not intended to have
any effect one way or the other on the so called Durrett issue. Is my understanding
correct?"
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tory reveals the withdrawal of an amendment, proposed by Senator Thurmond, that would have resolved the issue by granting
an irrebuttable presumption of reasonably equivalent value
when certain procedural requirements were met.1l2
Continuing its analysis, the Bundles court reviewed the
Ninth Circuit Madrid decision and attempted to reconcile the
Madrid holding with the language of § 548(a)(2)(A).1l3 The
Bundles court concluded that Madrid's irrebuttable presumption rule was inconsistent with the federal bankruptcy code in
three ways.114 First, it found Madrid inconsistent because the
irrebuttable presumption rule creates, in essence, a judge-made
"exception to the trustee's avoiding powers under section
548(a)(2)(A) - an exception not otherwise found in the statute."m Secondly, the Bundles court found Madrid inconsistent
because it has the effect of reading "good faith" into
§ 548(a)(2)(A).1l6 The court found the Madrid holding to imply
Dole: "The Senator's understanding is correct. . . . Senator Thurmond agreed to
delete from his amendment all provisions dealing with the Durrett issue. . .. [N)o provision of the bankruptcy bill passed by this body was intended to intimate any view one
way or the other regarding the correctness of the position taken. . . in the Durrett case,
or ... [in) Madrid, ... which reached a contrary result.
. . . [T)he amendment[s) should not be construed to in any way codify Durrett or
throw a cloud over noncollusive foreclosure sales .
. . . Finally, neither of the [amendments) purport to deal with the question of
whether a noncollusive, regularly conducted foreclosure sale should be deemed to be for
a reasonably equivalent value."
See Bundles, 856 F.2d at 821 n.8 (citing 130 Cong.Rec. § 13,771-13,772 ((Daily ed.) No.
131, Pt. II, October 5, 1984); see also In re Verna, 58 B.R. at 250.
112. In re Verna, 58 B.R. at 250. Senator Metzenbaum had objected to the inclusion
of the last proposed amendment because "this issue had not been considered in committee." See also In re Kachmizadeh, 108 B.R. 734, 738 (stating the 1984 BAFJA amendments did not address the reasonably equivalent value issue).
113. Bundles, 856 F.2d at 823
114. Id.
115. Id. (citing In re Richardson 23 B.R. 434, 446 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982) (stating
that an irrebuttable presumption of reasonable equivalence for non collusive, regularly
conducted public sales "proscribes" the factual inquiry into reasonable equivalence
which § 548(a)(2) was designed to facilitate); see also In re Madrid 21 B.R. at 428
(Volinn, J., dissenting) (stating that an irrebuttable presumption of reasonable equivalence excises "vital language" from § 548).
116. Bundles, 856 F.2d at 823. See also Scott B. Ehrlich, Avoidance of Foreclosure
Sales as Fraudulent Conveyances: Accommodating State and Federal Objectives, 71 VA.
L. REV. 933, 945 (1985). Ehrlich analyzes the appearance of the "reasonably equivalent
value" terminology in § 548 of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code as a replacement for the "fair
consideration" language of section 67d(2) of the old Code. He concludes that the switch
in phraseology "was an attempt to remove subjective considerations, such as good faith,
as criteria for the avoidance of fraudulent transfers." (emphasis added). Id.
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this good faith condition because "as long as the sale is conducted in good faith and in accordance with state law, the sale
price is conclusively presumed to be a reasonably equivalent
value."l17 The Bundles court found such a result "inconsistent
with section 548(a)(2)'s purpose of permitting the trustee to
avoid transfers as constructively fraudulent, irrespective of the
parties' actual intent."118 The Bundles court emphasized that
reading "good faith" into § 548 (a)(2) was inconsistent with the
section's purpose of allowing avoidance of constructionally
fraudulent transfers. 119 Finally, the Bundles court found Madrid
inconsistent with § 548 because "an irrebuttable presumption
renders section 548(a)(2) merely duplicative of other Code provisions such as section 548(a)(1) and 544(b)."120
The Bundles decision offers a recent and extensive analysis
of the reasonably equivalent value issue and represents the present law in the Seventh Circuit. Since Durrett in 1980, the various circuit courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have attempted
to formulate a workable rule of law with regard to the application of § 548(a)(2)(A). The courts have struggled to balance the
interests represented by the Bankruptcy Code's fraudulent conveyance statutes with equally important concerns for stability in
the state foreclosure markets. These efforts have resulted in a
split among the circuits as evidenced by the above cases.
IV.

THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

In BFP v. Imperial Savings and Loan Association,121 the
Ninth Circuit settled two issues. First, the court held that the
BFP partnership did in fact have a property interest in the
Foreman home as a result of the state court ruling quieting title
117. Bundles, 856 F.2d at 823.
118. Id; see 4 L. King, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 11 548.02-03 (15th ed. 1988); see also
Ehrlich, supra note 116, at 956 (supporting the Bundles court analysis).
119. Bundles, 856 F.2d at 823.
120. Id. The court points out that such a reading would make § 548(a)(2)(A) redundant in the sense that section 548(a)(1) already allows for avoidance of transfers "with
actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity . . . . " Bundles, 856 F.2d at 823
n.13. Section 544(b) provides "the trustee may avoid any transfer ... that is voidable
under applicable law . . . . " 856 F.2d at 823 n.14.
121. BFP v. Imperial Savings and Loan Ass'n (In re BFP), 974 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir.
1992), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 37 (1993).
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in favor of the BFP partnership and the Foremans.122 The finding of a property interest was a necessary element in allowing
BFP to seek avoidance of the transfer under § 548(a)(2). The
Ninth Circuit gave the state court holding "full faith and
credit"123 as a valid judgment despite finding the state court's
reasoning "difficult to follow."124 Secondly, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel holding
that the "price received at a non-collusive, regularly conducted
foreclosure sale established irrebuttably reasonably equivalent
value under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A)."1211 This holding is
squarely in line with the long standing Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel decision in In re Madrid. 128
A. BFP PROPERTY INTEREST EXISTED

The Ninth Circuit held that the state court judgment quieting title in favor of BFP and the Foremans (as against all
others) would stand, and did create a property interest in
BFP .127 The court affirmed the state court quiet title judgment
in spite of the state court's unclear reasoning. us
Imperial argued that BFP did not obtain good title to the
property because of the earlier state court ruling rescinding the
sale of the home from Foreman to Pedersen. 129 Imperial also
pointed out that the Pedersens, whose fraudulent behavior
caused the rescission of the deed from Foreman to Pedersen,
122. In re BFP, 974 F.2d 1144, 1147·48 (9th Cir. 1992).
123. Id. at 1147.
124. Id. The Ninth Circuit described the unclear reasoning of the state court:
The state court seems to hold that the Foreman-Pedersen
deed became avoidable by a failure of consideration caused by
the Pedersens.... There is language in the judgment that
implies that the failure of consideration took place as a result
of the Pedersen's subsequent breach of both the BFP partnership agreement and contractual duties owed to the Foremans.
How this breach would cause a failure of consideration, as that
concept is normally understood, or how the breach would affect the original grant, is not explained.
BFP, 974 F.2d at 1148 n.3.
125. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1148.
126. In re Madrid, 21 B.R. 424 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982), aff'd on other grounds, 725
F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984).
127. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1147-48.
128. Id. at 1147 n.3.
129. [d. at 1147.
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were general partners in BFP. Therefore, Imperial argued, BFP
should not have been able to obtain "bona fide purchaser" status since knowledge of the fraud would be imputed to BFP
under California partnership law. 130 The Ninth Circuit implicitly
acknowledged that both arguments were sound and that neither
was clearly resolved by the lower courtS. 13l In addition, the
Ninth Circuit noted that the state court ruling seemed to confuse the consideration issue with the Pedersen's fraudulent behavior.132 The Ninth Circuit did not attempt to harmonize all of
the language or judgments of the lower courts. Instead, the court
resolved the issue by affirming the state court quiet title judgment in favor of BFP and confirming BFP's interest in the property at the time of the foreclosure sale. 133
B.

REASONABLY EQUIVALENT VALUE RECEIVED

The Ninth Circuit, acknowledging the issue was a "close
one,"134 affirmed the judgment of the Bankruptcy Appellate
Pimel which found reasonably equivalent value to exist irrebuttably when a noncollusive, regularly conducted state foreclosure
sale is held. 131i This decision follows the reasoning of the earlier
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel decision in In re Madrid. 136 It is
also in line with the decision in In re Winshall Settlor's
Trust,137 in which the Sixth Circuit stated "the better view is
that reasonable equivalence for the purposes of a foreclosure
sale under § 548(a)(2)(A) should be consonant with the state
law of fraudulent conveyance."138
The Ninth Circuit conceded its decision was at odds with
both the Seventh Circuit decision in Bundles, and the Fifth Cir130. [d. at 1147 n.2. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 15,012 (Deering 1979).
131. The bankruptcy court ruled that BFP did not have a property interest because
of the prior rescission. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel chose to avoid addressing this
ruling because by the same reasoning, Imperial would also lack a property interest. See
supra note 49. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged these arguments by Imperial but preferred to set these "legal arguments aside." BFP, 974 F.2d at 1147.
132. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1147 n.3.
133. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1147-48.
134. [d. at 1148.
135. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1149.
136. Madrid, 21 B.R. 424 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982).
137. In re Winshall Settlor's Trust, 758 F.2d 1136 (6th Cir. 1985).
138. Id. at 1139.
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cuit decision in Durrett. ls9 It explained that the analyses of
these two courts rested "on a plain language interpretation of
§ 548(a)(2)"140 and call for a determination of reasonable equivalence "depend[ing] on all the facts of each case."l41 The Ninth
Circuit noted the Bundles court's argument that the granting of
an irrebuttable presumption, in effect, creates a judicial exception to the avoiding powers of § 548. 142 This exception, the
Ninth Circuit pointed out, undermines the ability of the debtor
or trustee to recover lost equity, the very purpose of the § 548
avoiding power .14S
The Ninth Circuit recognized the "persuasive"l" position
represented by these contrary cases, but reasoned that "broader
considerations require a different result.m4Ci The court concluded
that the stability of the state foreclosure market and "due regard for traditional state areas of regulation"146 were considerations which outweighed the concerns expressed by the Bundles
and Durrett courts and their plain language interpretations of
§ 548.147 The court stated that by using the "Madrid formulation, [it is] able to balance bankruptcy policy and comity concerns."149 Furthermore, the court cited support for its position
within both the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and the American Bar Association.149
V.

CRITIQUE

While acknowledging the merit of a plain language interpretation of § 548(a)(2), the Ninth Circuit nevertheless determined,
III BFP v. Imperial Savings and Loan Association/ Cio that
139. BFP. 974 F.2d at 1148.
140. Id. (citing In re Bundles. 856 F.2d 815. 824 (7th Cir. 1988)).
141. BFP. 974 F.2d at 1148 n.5 (quoting Bundles. 856 F.2d at 824).
142. Id. (citing Bundles. 856 F.2d at 823).
143. Id.
144. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1148.
145. Id.
146. BFP. 974 F.2d at 1149.
147. Id. at 1148-49.
148. Id. at 1149.
149. Id. at 1149 n.6. See UNIFORM FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 3(b) (West 1984);
see also 1983 A.B.A. SEC. OF REAL PROP. REP. 106B.
150. BFP v. Imperial Savings and Loan Ass'n (In re BFP). 974 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir.
1992), cert. granted. 114 S. Ct. 37 (1993).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol24/iss3/4

20

Kilty: Bankruptcy Law

BANKRUPTCY LAW

1994]

567

"broader considerations require a different result."UH The reasoning behind the Ninth Circuit decision then, lies in the substance of these "broader considerations."
A.

THE POTENTIAL DESTABILIZING EFFECT OF ApPLICATION OF

§

548(a)(2)(A) ON STATE FORECLOSURE MARKETS

First, the Ninth Circuit voiced concern that "allowing a
bankruptcy court to undo a foreclosure sale carries with it the
strong potential to destabilize state mortgage transactions."1112
Quoting Professor Ehrlich in his article Avoidance of Foreclosure Sales as Fraudulent Conveyances: Accommodating State
and Federal Objectives,1113 the Ninth Circuit points to the
problems created from both federal and state perspectives:
The prospect that trial courts will determine reasonable equivalence on a case-by-case basis is untenable from both federal and state perspectives.
From the state viewpoint, an ad-hoc approach
produces intolerable uncertainty regarding the finality of any purchase at a foreclosure sale . . . .
From a federal perspective, this uncertainty undermines the price-maximizing objectives of section 548(a)(2) because potential buyers will discount their [bids] . . . to reflect this
uncertainty. 1114

This assessment by Professor Ehrlich captures the nature of
the dilemma faced by courts endeavoring to effectively apply
§ 548 without defeating its purpose. By avoiding transfers for
lack of reasonably equivalent value, courts could potentially be
decreasing the amounts bid at future foreclosure sales by creating doubt about the finality of any given transaction. Such
doubt can create instability in foreclosure markets and decrease
the number of willing, aggressive purchasers. When demand at
151. [d. at 1148. The two considerations identified by the court are: 1) the instability created in foreclosure markets when a foreclosure sale is undone by a bankruptcy
court, and 2) the tension that exists in balancing the interests of the federal Bankruptcy
Code with state foreclosure law. [d.
152. [d.
.
153. Scott B. Ehrlich, Avoidance of Foreclosure Sales as Fraudulent Conveyances:
Accommodating State and Federal Objectives, 71 VA. L. REV. 933 (1985).
154. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1148 (citing Ehrlich, supra note 153, at 963-64).
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forced sales is lower, prices received will inevitably fall. The
great concern the Ninth Circuit expressed for the potentially destabilizing effect of overturning foreclosure sales through caseby-case application of § 548(a)(2)(A) is clearly valid. Most circuit court opinions on the § 548 issue address this concern. m
However, it is worth noting that the Ninth Circuit, while relying
on Professor Ehrlich's concise assessment of the problem, ignored his proposed solution. It is especially worthy of note because the ultimate BFP holding is inconsistent with Ehrlich's
thesis.
Professor Ehrlich is concerned about the destabilizing, undermining effects of case-by-case trial court analysis and suggests that "federal courts must be sensitive to the context in
which the transfer occurred and the disruptive effects of post
foreclosure avoidance on real estate transactions."11l6 Importantly, he also recognizes that "the purpose and function of section 548(a)(2) is precisely to allow the trustee to pierce the finality of the foreclosure sale."11l7 Professor Ehrlich's proposed
solution is a compromise: "The courts should limit the scope of
section 548(a)(2) review to an initial evaluation of the state foreclosure procedures, rather than to the quantitative sufficiency
of the bid received at sale."11l8 As a result, the trustee must meet
a "double burden."11l9 First, the trustee must show that "state
foreclosure procedures are insufficiently structured to produce a
maximum forced sale price,"l60 and second, if the foreclosure
procedures are inadequate, "the trustee must also prove that the
sale price was less than a reasonably equivalent value."lsl Thus,
155. See, e.g., In re Madrid, 725 F.2d 1197, 1202 (9th Cir. 1984) ("[C]reation of a de
facto right of redemption would significantly chill participation at foreclosure sales,
where sale prices ... already are frequently lower than the actual value of the property
sold."), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984); In re Bundles, 856 F.2d 815, 823, n.12 (7th Cir.
1988) ("[The] central policy concern expressed in the opinions is that permitting avoidance of foreclosure sales under § 548(a)(2) would have a negative effect on the foreclosure market.").
156. Ehrlich, supra note 153, at 966.
157. Id. at 962.
158. [d. (emphasis added).
159. [d. at 967.
160. Id.
161. [d. Ehrlich also states that "[i]n making this determination, however, the
courts must recognize that due to the failings of state procedures, no rational forced sale
value is available for comparative use, and the courts should apply section 548 strictly,
using the retail market value of the property for comparative purposes." Id.
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under Professor Ehrlich's proposed system of judicial review,
"federal courts should continue, as many have done, to enforce
section 548 in accordance with its terms until state procedures
are revamped."162 This proposed system attempts to address the
state and federal concerns, while sustaining the authority of
§ 548(a)(2) and the policies it embodies. 163 .
In contrast, while the Ninth Circuit holding does address
the state and federal concerns about uncertainty in the foreclosure markets, it does so at the expense of the Federal Bankruptcy Code's authority. To the extent that compliance with
'regular' state foreclosure procedures creates an irrebuttable presumption of reasonably equivalent value received, § 548(a)(2) is
stripped of its capacity to "pierce the finality of the foreclosure
sale. "164 Professor Ehrlich's model, focusing on the sufficiency of
existing state foreclosure sale procedures, rather than on price,
seeks to interpret § 548(a) (2) in a way that will lessen the potential for uncertainty in foreclosure markets and, at the same
time, keep the avoiding power of § 548 alive. The Ninth Circuit
holding effectively eliminates the avoiding power of § 548 by
telling the courts: "You may not, under § 548(a)(2), undo any
foreclosure sale that complies with applicable law and is noncollusive."
There are two problems with the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of § 548(a)(2). First, a judicial interpretation of § 548(a)(2)
which renders it ineffective is arguably beyond the Ninth Circuit's proper power.16~ The concern over foreclosure market instability is essentially a policy concern. It is well settled that
when policy concerns call for an outcome that directly conflicts
with the intentions of an unambiguous federal statute, the call is
162. Id.
163. Ehrlich is suggesting that the courts use § 548 to indirectly monitor the reasonably equivalent value standard by beginning the judicial inquiry with attention to the
procedures in place within the state. In this way, the courts can employ § 548(a)(2),
protecting the interests of the debtor (and his or her unsecured creditors), and at the
same time, provide the foreclosure markets with some degree of insulation, so that price
alone will not void a transfer. Instead, a combination of inadequate procedures and insufficient price would be required to avoid a sale.
164. Ehrlich, supra note 153, at 962.
165. The Bundles court expressed clearly the court's duty stating: "Congress has set
forth a federal standard. We must giue effect to that congressional will, however ambiguous its manifestation." Bundles, 856 F.2d 815, 822 (emphasis added).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1994

23

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 24, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 4

570

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 24:547

for congressional action, not judicial action. ISS Courts and commentators analyzing § 548(a)(2) cases have, for the most part,
come to the same conclusion. ls7
Secondly, under this Ninth Circuit holding, § 548(a)(2)
ceases to be an impetus to improve state foreclosure sale procedures. Importantly, it is these procedures which, in the long run,
generate higher foreclosure sale prices. ISS There is no longer an
impetus because, under BFP, so long as the foreclosure sale is
regular and noncollusive, there no longer exists the threat of
avoidance for lack of reasonably equivalent value received under
§ 548(a)(2)}S9 Where there is no threat of avoidance, there is no
incentive to improve the methods which generate the sale price
received. 170
166. See, e.g., Solberg v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. Rptr. 460 (Cal. 1977) ("When statutory language is ... clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, and
courts should not indulge in it.").
167. See, e.g., Bundles, 956 F.2d at 823 ("Any change deemed desirable on policy
grounds should be addressed to Congress rather than to this court."); In re Hulm, 738
F.2d 323, 327 (8th Cir. 1984) ("The Bankruptcy Code provisions are clear. . . . [P)olicy
considerations cannot affect the outcome in this case, but must be addressed, if at all, by
Congress."); Madrid, 21 B.R. at 428 n.1 (Volinn, J., dissenting) (defining the issue as
essentially a policy concern that should probably be dealt with legislatively); Ellen A.
Feinberg, Durrett, After the 1984 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, 59 JUL Fla.
B.J. 41 (noting the detrimental effects on the stability of titles purchased at foreclosure
sales and suggesting that Congress, not the judiciary, should address policy considerations by amending the Bankruptcy Code); but see Madrid, 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1984)
(expressing by its holding the belief that judicial action is appropriate); see In re Winshall Settlor's Trust, 758 F.2d 1136 (6th Cir. 1985) (following the holding in Madrid).
168. See infra notes 173-178 and related text for discussion of the effect of improved foreclosure sale procedures on sale prices received.
169. In contrast, under Professor Ehrlich's system, § 548(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy
Code continues to act as an impetus to the equitable distribution of the debtor's property. Under Professor Ehrlich's model, the courts will ultimately evaluate the foreclosure
sale price to determine if it is reasonably equivalent value. This is done only when, in the
court's judgment, the state foreclosure procedures are not structured in a way that maximizes the foreclosure sale price; Ehrlich, supra note 153, at 967.
170. To be sure, there could be other incentives to improving foreclosure sale procedures. But under this Ninth Circuit holding, § 548(a)(2) would not provide an incentive.
Section 548's value as an impetus to improving foreclosure procedures can be seen in a
hypothetical example:
State A's foreclosure procedures are inadequate and consistently result in low foreclosure sale prices. State B's foreclosure
sale procedures are effective and consistently result in relatively higher foreclosure sale prices received. Section
548(a)(2)'s avoiding powers would be used successfully more
often in State A, where a reasonably equivalent value is rarely
received. This would encourage State A to improve it's foreclosure procedures to avoid the disruptive effects of § 548
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The Ninth Circuit decision, by creating an irrebuttable presumption of reasonably equivalent value, removes the destabilizing effect of § 548(a)(2) avoidances on state foreclosure markets. In theory, more stable foreclosure markets should lead to
higher prices received. But at the same time, the Ninth Circuit
must be aware that in effectively erasing the avoiding power of
§ 548(a)(2), the court is also removing a force which would also
lead to higher prices received.
While the Ninth Circuit cites Professor Ehrlich's model,171
the idea that efforts to increase the price received at a forced
sale should focus on improving the procedures surrounding the
sale has wide support among other commentators as well. 172
Many commentators have identified the need for more effective
procedures in state foreclosure proceedings. 173 Some have suggested improved quality and scope of foreclosure sale publication through the use of readily available marketing systems. 174
Other suggestions include the allowance of time for due diligence. Such allowance would increase bid prices by removing
buyer concerns over title status and property conditions which
exist in typical foreclosure proceedings. l7II The creation of a sysapplication.
171. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1148. Professor Ehrlich's model suggests that § 548(a)(2) be
used, in effect, to police the procedures surrounding the foreclosure sale rather than to
police the price received at the sale. Ehrlich, supra note 153, at 965-66.
172. See generally, Ehrlich, supra note 153 (focusing on judicial review of state procedures rather than of value received at foreclosure sales); Gover & West, supra note 64
(addressing the need for reform in the Texas state foreclosure process); Steven Wechsler,
Through the Looking Glass: Foreclosure By Sale As De Facto Strict Foreclosure - An
Empirical Study of Mortgage Foreclosure and Subsequent Resale, 70 CORNELL L. REV.
850, 870-71 (1985) (presenting a study showing inefficiencies in state foreclosure procedures and suggesting that further study and experimentation should be undertaken to
improve the foreclosure sale process).
173. See infra notes 174-79 and accompanying text.
174. See, e.g., Ehrlich, supra note 153, at 977 ("In most jurisdictions, notice of the
foreclosure sale is usually obscured in the legal notice section of a local newspaper and,
perhaps, posted on the courthouse bulletin board and on the property. . . . The inadequacy of the advertising function of contemporary state notice requirements seems particularly inexcusable in light of the availability of ordinary market mechanisms to advertise the sale without substantial additional costs."); Gover & West, supra note 66, at
1087 (suggesting that the trustee should list the property with a licensed real estate broker on or before the posting date since a competent real estate broker would know how
best to advertise the property for sale and has an incentive for marketing the property to
the best advantage of both the lender and the debtor).
175. See Ehrlich, supra note 153, at 979 (arguing that a "presale title report" should
be made available to potential bidders and that "a reasonable period of time" be allowed
to close the sale); see also Gover & West, supra note 66, at 1087 (suggesting the success-
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tern with available financing would necessarily broaden the potential purchaser market.t 76 These suggested changes, many of
which are reasonable and can be easily implemented, must be
tempered by concerns for the timing and certainty of the foreclosure sale process. 177 The trustee cannot be expected to bear
the financial burden of a cumbersome foreclosure process. 178
This note does not attempt to catalogue the inadequacies
that exist in the various state foreclosure procedures. Nor does it
note all of the proposed solutions. Suffice it to say that the large
volume of writings on the inadequacy of the foreclosure procedures in many different states, lends great support to the proposition that the elimination of § 548(a)(2) as an impetus to improving state foreclosure procedures is unwise.179
B.

BALANCING STATE AND FEDERAL COMITY CONCERNS

The second of the Ninth Circuit's broad considerations was
"the growing tension between preemption and the requirements
of a vigorous federal system."180 Essentially the court is identifying the comity181 concerns involved in § 548(a) (2) cases. The
court claimed that it saw the issue as one of both "statutory interpretation" and this "growing tension."182 The Ninth Circuit
concluded that "by following the Madrid formulation we are
able to give a reasonable meaning to § 548 without unduly upsetting ... state law."183 By use of the Madrid formula, "we are
ful bidder be required to deposit with the trustee at least ten percent of the bid price
and enter into a contract containing customary terms and conditions).
176. See Ehrlich, supra note 153, at 978 (stating that the cash bid requirement at
the foreclosure sale virtually eliminates all persons from bidding at the sale except professional foreclosure specialists).
177. See Gover & West, supra note 66, at 1087 (recognizing the revised procedures
advocated could burden or 'clog' the debtors equity of redemption).
178. Present value considerations should also be a part of the "reasonably
equivalent value" formula. See Gover & West, supra note 66.
179. See text accompanying notes 174-78.
180. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1149. This tension apparently refers to the conflict between
state law and "vigorous" federal statutory law. [d.
181. "Comity" is defined as: "In general, the principle of 'comity' is that courts of
one. . . jurisdiction will give effect to laws and judicial decisions of another ... jurisdiction, not as a matter of obligation but out of deference and mutual respect." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 267 (6th ed. 1990). When the federal court defers to state law in its
interpretation of § 548, as it has in BFP, the principle of comity is present.
182. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1149.
183. [d.
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able to balance bankruptcy policy and comity concerns. "184
The Ninth Circuit decision does avoid 'unduly upsetting'
state law. The court's irrebuttable presumption interpretation
results in a federal standard of reasonably equivalent value that
is essentially subsumed under state law. If state law is satisfied,
the reasonably equivalent value standard is satisfied, without
further inquiry. However, the question remains: "Does this interpretation give 'reasonable meaning' to the federal statute?"
There is strong argument, presented in the Bundles decision and
recognized by the Ninth Circuit as "persuasive," that such an
interpretation gives the federal statute essentially no meaning. 181!
It is difficult to understand the Ninth Circuit's reasoning here.
In one paragraph, the court recognized as "persuasive" the Bundles court position that an irrebuttable presumption creates a
judicial exception which undermines the purpose of the § 548
avoiding powers. 186 In the next paragraph, the court claimed
that such an interpretation gives 'reasonable meaning' to the
statute. 187 The Ninth Circuit provides no real analytical support
for this conclusion. Neither is there any real analysis to support
the court's conclusion that it has balanced bankruptcy policy
and comity concerns.
The Ninth Circuit sought support for its deferential position in the Supreme Court case of Cipollone v. Liggett Group.188
Cipollone emphasized that "interpretation of federal statutes
should be tempered with due regard for traditional state areas of
regulation."l89 It can be argued, that in interpreting
§ 548(a)(2)(A), the court went further in the BFP holding than
184. Id.

185. The Bundles court recognized the irrebuttable presumption interpretation as
inconsistent with the language of § 548. Bundles, 856 F.2d at 823. The Ninth Circuit
acknowledged the strength of the Bundles court's reasoning stating: "The [Bundles
court's) position is persuasive but we think that broader considerations require a different result." BFP, 974 F.2d at 1148. Bundles also cites the dissent of Justice Volinn in In
re Madrid ("The majority has excised vital language from § 548 in order to create an
exception to the statute.... "), In re Madrid, 21 B.R. at 428 (Volinn J., dissenting); and
In re Richardson ("[An I)rrebuttable presumption ... proscribes the factual inquiry
. . . § 548(a)(2) was designed to facilitate.") In re Richardson, 23 B.R. 434, 446 (Bankr.
D.Utah 1982).
186. BFP, 974 F.2d at 1148.
187. Id.
188. Cippollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S.Ct. 2608 (1992).
189. Id. at 2617-18.
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is suggested by the Cipollone Court. Cipollone counseled the
courts to proceed with due regard when federal statutes apply in
areas where state regulation is traditional. The state foreclosure
markets are such areas. What the Ninth Circuit accomplished
with its holding is not, however, an expression of due regard. In
accommodating the state law in this area of traditional state regulation, BFP effectively preempts the federal statute. The Madrid dissent argued that "with a conclusive or irrebuttable presumption of reasonableness. . . the majority's logic in applying
§ 548 as a factor in its decision is illusory."ISO
Judge Volinn's dissent in Madrid also set forth an interpretation of the § 548 standard which seems to satisfy Cipollone's
call for "due regard for traditional state areas of regulation."lsl
Judge Volinn suggested giving a "strong presumption of adequacy" for value received where state foreclosure procedures are
followed in a non-collusive foreclosure sale.192 Such an interpretation properly places state and federal concerns on unequal
footing: deference, by way of the strong presumption, is made to
state regulations. ISS At the same time, such a reading does not
make the federal statute "illusory."ls.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In BFP v. Imperial Savings and Loan Association/Sf> the
Ninth Circuit held that the price received at a nonfraudulent
foreclosure sale, when conducted in compliance with applicable
procedural law, satisfies the reasonably equivalent value standard of § 548(a)(2) as a matter of law. The Ninth Circuit opinion was heavily influenced by concerns for certainty. in the state
190. In re Madrid, 21 B.R. at 428 (Volinn, J., dissenting).
191. In re BFP, 974 F.2d at 1149.
192. Madrid, 21 B.R. at 428; see also In re Grissom, 955 F.2d 1440, 1446 (11th Cir.
1992) (stating that absent fraud, collusion, or irregular procedures, the courts should
presume that a legitimate foreclosure sale brings a price which is reasonably equivalent
to the property's value).
193. See Grissom, 955 F.2d at 1449 ("[Only by) conduct[ing) a thorough inquiry of
all relevant facts and circumstances . . . . do we provide adequate deference to state
foreclosure proceedings and the rights of secured creditors, without unduly trammeling
upon the policies of the bankruptcy laws.") (emphasis added). This statement supports
the notion that deference, or 'due regard,' can be paid to state foreclosure law while
thorough inquiries are made under § 548.
194. In re Madrid, 21 B.R. 424, 428 (Volinn, J. dissenting) (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982).
195. 974 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 37 (1993).
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foreclosure markets. To assure certainty and stability in these
markets, the Ninth Circuit equated compliance with state foreclosure law, in a nonfraudulent setting, to reasonable equivalence for purposes of the Federal Bankruptcy Code.
The holding is troubling, however, because the court overlooked judicial middle ground which would give meaning to the
federal standard of "reasonably equivalent value" and, at the
same time, maintain stability in the state foreclosure markets.
Judicial scrutiny, focusing on the quality of the state foreclosure
procedures, rather than on mere compliance with the procedures, or on the quantitative price received at sale, can accomplish this aim. Courts, such as In re Lindsay,196 and commentators, such as Professor Ehrlich,197 have described this middle
ground.
In addition, the question is raised, whether the Ninth Circuit, in departing from a plain language interpretation of
§ 548(a)(2), went too far in its judicial capacity. In trying to balance state and federal interests, without unduly upsetting state
law, the Ninth Circuit stripped the Bankruptcy Code's reasonably equivalent value standard of its meaning. When a federal
statute is interpreted judicially in such a way that it loses its
meaning, the call for legislative action is loud and clear.
Kevin F. Kilty*

196. In re Lindsay, 98 B.R. 983 (Bankr. S.D.Cal. 1989) (proposing a three· part test
which included commercial reasonableness as a factor). See supra notes 78·83 and ac·
companying text.
197. Ehrlich, supra note 153 at 965·66 (suggesting the courts focus on a review of
the procedural aspects of the foreclosure sale rather than on the price received at the
sale).
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1995.
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